Indiana State Fair Incident Overview - Not Your Average Greek Tragedy

[Erich Friend]

On Saturday night, August 13, 2011, and estimated crowd of 12,000 assembled to watch the band Sugarland play at the Indiana State Fair.  The sky was covered with dark clouds, there was lightning shooting out of them, and a huge gust of wind, typical of Midwest summer storms, came across the venue, caught the tarp covered canopy some 50-60 feet in the air, and folded the portable structure over like it was made out of toothpicks.  5 dead (one was an IATSE Union Stagehand / Follow Spotlight Operator), 45 injured.  Another person died of severe head trauma a week later, and another the folowing week.  The crowd rushed toward the fallen structure and a sea of frantic people worked to manually raise the tons of aluminum, loudspeakers, lights, cabling, and canopy cover off of those trapped below it as the rain began to fall.

 

Political Assessment

 

Extensive news coverage of this has the State of Indiana running for political cover.  Platitudes about how wonderful the audience’s response to the surprise show come from all corners (and mostly well deserved, too) in an effort to deflect the attention away from the emergency planning shortcomings.  Proclamations that this was ‘totally unexpected’, a ‘freak event’, an ‘act of God’, or that it was ‘unforeseeable’ are making facility managers and politician look like fools.

 

So far the only real information that has come out has been that there is no agency in Indiana that is responsible for inspecting portable stage and canopy structures.  Can you say HUGE GAPING HOLE?  Sure you can.  http://www.theindychannel.com/stage-collapse/28874635/detail.html and http://www.indystar.com/article/20110816/NEWS15/108160318/Inspectio...

 

If you want to learn more about this tragedy (you know: the frowny theatre face), then some of the best local news coverage has been by Indianapolis Channel 6 News (http://www.theindychannel.com/stage-collapse/index.html) and the local newspaper the IndyStar (http://www.indystar.com/section/NEWS15).  Other good resources for this incident have been:

• Jim Hutchison’s JimOnLight Blog (www.JimOnLight.com)
• John Huntington’s ControlGeek Blog (www.ControlGeek.net)
• A retrospective on the ANSI / PLASA / ESTA E2.21 – 2006 standard for these types of stages (Temporary Ground-Supported Overhead Structures Used To Cover Stage Areas and Support Equipment in the Production of Outdoor Entertainment Events) can be read at http://livedesignonline.com/theatre/mighty_wind_load_1008/index.html
• TheatreSafetyBlog (http://theatresafetyblog.blogspot.com/ )

 

Structural Assessment

 

Indiana State Fair Commission Chairman Andre Lacy announced at an afternoon news conference on August 16^th (http://www.theindychannel.com/news/28884485/detail.html) that Thornton Tomasetti (www.thorntontomasetti.com), a New York City-based international engineering company, had been retained to complete an internal investigation.

 

"Our goal is to learn everything we can about why this tragedy occurred," he told reporters. "There isn't going to be any question that we aren't going to investigate. We will continue to ask the tough questions."

Lacy said the company would review the stage structure, the rigging above the stage and how equipment was loaded onto the structure.

 

Scott Nacheman, a vice president in Thornton Tomasetti’s Chicago office, said the process would likely be wrapped up by the end of the year.  Thornton Tomasetti will then provide the State Fair Commission with a report of findings and recommendations, which officials said they will make public.

 

"We know that many are eager for answers today. We don't have them, and we won't speculate. It will take some time to reach conclusions," Lacy said.

 

Once the report is published it will likely be one of key pieces of evidence for the lawsuits that are likely to be filed.

 

When it comes to injuries or death on Indiana state property, Indiana law stipulates that the amount paid out to each person cannot exceed $700,000, with an overall cap of $5 million paid-out to all parties.  Other lawsuits filed against the staging company, Mid-America Stage, the staging manufacturer, the bands, promoters, and managers will significantly extend the array of litigation to come.

WTHR TV station posted this story that compares the 2011 canopy support structure  to the 2004 support structure:  http://www.wthr.com/story/15286083/engineers-question-cross-bracing...

 

UPDATE 2012-04-12:  Indiana State Fair Commission reports are now available online at:  www.in.gov/sfc

Weather Assessment

 

Another aspect of this incident that will have to be addressed is the criteria that is used for determining when and if a show is to be cancelled or postponed due to weather.  Many have asked if there was an anemometer (wind speed detector) attached to the top of the canopy support towers.  Considerations about the local wind speed should be one piece of the decision process, however it is really of minor significance when you look at the speed and direction of the weather front that is driving the air pressure shifts.  By the time any local anemometer is relaying significant wind speeds, it may be too late to effect any well organized shut-down and evacuation plan.

 

Plow winds that lead a storm front are well documented to come 10-15 miles in advance of the visible part of a storm.  Local wind speed may appear moderate and then increase rapidly as the air pressure changes.  This is why wind shear radar is important - it can show the speed and direction of the largely invisible air mass around an event site.  The local wind shear radar maps around the Indiana State Fair site clearly show this and were available to the event staff if they had only known to look for it.

 

Understanding that it takes time to evacuate truss-spot operators, drop the sails (sun screens, visual backdrops, projection screens, LED walls, advertising banners, etc.), lower the overhead canopies, and turn-off the electrical power means that decisions need to be made about weather at least an hour or so in advance of the visible storm front (aka: the big black clouds).  As you can see in the videos and photographs of the incident, the BIG BLACK CLOUDS were already there.

 

Another criteria for determining when to clear an outdoor venue is the lightning strike pattern.  This is routinely monitored with lighting strike detectors that are hand-held and portable.  Similar information is also available via monitoring of local weather networks.  The evacuation criteria for lightning strikes is generally a 10-15 mile radius, depending upon the speed of the weather front.  If children’s soccer teams and football games can be shut-down by using these inexpensive tools, then why weren’t 12,000 potential victims afforded the same regard?  Numerous reports from audience members described lightning overhead BEFORE the canopy collapse.  The follow spotlight operators on the canopy trusses were in-place, too, so they were near the top of a metal lightning rod (the aluminum truss structure).

 

When you combine the speed of the storm front, the lightning erupting from the dark clouds overhead, and the known potential for wind gusts, it makes little sense that the PA speakers and canopy were not lowered an hour or so before the incident.

WTHR TV posted this story about the State hiring an outside consultant to evaluate the Emergency Planning and Preparedness for this and similar events:  http://www.wthr.com/story/15293118/gov-daniels-hires-outside-firm-t...

 

Electrical Assessment

 

When the structure broke apart and collapsed, it further stressed wiring and cables that were strung throughout the truss and canopy system.  Fortunately, none of the power cables were cut or torn apart and came in contact with the metal truss components.  IT WAS ALMOST ½ HOUR AFTER THE COLAPSE BEFORE POWER TO THE STAGE WAS DISCONNECTED.  What safety protocol was not in place to cover the need to disconnect power BEFORE the storm struck?

 

Adding insult to injury:

 

Indiana State Fair spokesperson Andy Klotz said in a public meeting (http://www.theindychannel.com/news/28889811/detail.html) that “We followed a protocol very directly.  It was working.  This was a freakish act of God, and I don’t know how it could have been prevented.”

 

Really!?  Do they think that we are that stupid?  The safety protocol they had didn’t allow them to make a decision to evacuate the space until the storm was RIGHT ON TOP OF THE VENUE?  That is not a safety protocol by any stretch of the imagination.  “It was working.”  Again:  REALLY!?  How’d that work out for you?  Five Seven dead, 45 injured, millions of dollars of property damage, shows having to be moved to other venues, a multi-million dollar accident investigation . . .  “This was a freakish act of God”  One more time:  REALLY!?  Nowhere in the past history of Indiana has there been a storm that is lead by plow winds in the middle of the summer.  Nah, this never happens around here [sarcasm, for those that don’t know it when they read it] . . .  “I don’t know how it could have been prevented.”  And another chorus (please join-in)  REALLY!?  I’ll go out on a limb here and say this [opinions expressed herein are solely those of the blogger and do not necessarily reflect those of the Web Site management / publisher - ed]:  If you don’t know the answer to this, then you shouldn’t be holding the position of employment you currently have.  It is your responsibility to manage the venue safely.  This means knowing these things.

[Erich Friend]

Here is an interview with production safety experts in Australia discussing their observations of the recent stage incidents that have marred the industry.  It is good to see this talked about openly and frankly.  http://theatresafetyblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/stage-safety-special-...